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This thesis analyzes the general characteristics of a state’s fiscal jurisdiction and
how they influence the process of interaction with other national tax jurisdictions. The
paper figures out essential internal substance of fiscal jurisdiction and its reflection on the
necessity of interstate fiscal cooperation. After considering this substance the thesis goes
on to explore the limits beyond which national jurisdictions cannot go in collection of
taxes. Absence of common bases of these limits leads to conflicts between national
jurisdictions and calls for close international fiscal cooperation. The thesis argues that the
process of cooperation becomes more evident. In summary the thesis states that today’s
main characteristics of a state’s jurisdiction to tax do not comply with the necessity of
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The actuality of this thesis is determined by the conflict between development of
world economic relations in the process of globalization and more conservative
development of international fiscal relations. The implications of globalization are
profound. Tax policy requires not only the identification of the tax bases, but also the
ability of governments to tax them. 1 As Reuven Avi-Yonah justly said: “Taxes are the
last topic on which one would expect sovereign nations to reach a consensus”. 2
In the modern world of freedom of movement of persons, capital, and goods
conservative self-limitations of national tax systems can propose only one method of the
solution of tax problems arising out of mobility of businesses and people – extraterritorial
legislation, i.e. jurisdiction to prescribe taxes. But exercise of only one type of
jurisdiction – jurisdiction to prescribe taxes – is not enough for effective administration
of national tax law. It is necessary also to find means to follow the mobile factors and
ensure fulfillment of national fiscal laws outside territorial borders. For this purpose
national systems should seek international cooperation. Unfortunately, this cooperation
does not have long history and need to achieve the same level of internationalization as
                                                                
1 Jack M. Mintz, National Tax Policy and Global Competition, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1285, 1288
(2001).
2 Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1301, 1303 (1996).
2do the bus iness and social life. The general view today is that national tax regimes need
to take global economic integration into account.3
The most important features of a state’s jurisdiction to tax taken in international
scope is the objective of this thesis. Within the topic of fiscal jurisdiction this paper deals
mostly with income taxation, even though customs, value-added, excise, gift, and other
taxes imposed by various jurisdictions can have international implications.
The objective has determined the purpose of the thesis, which is to analyze
general characteristics of a state’s fiscal jurisdiction and how they influence the process
of interaction with other national jurisdictions.
As the basic method of the present research the systematic method was used.
National tax systems were analyzed as elements of more general international system.
The method of comparative jurisprudence was used as subsid iary method. The study of
the experience of different countries, including international organizations, helps to see
the general tendency in the development of the approaches to the solution of problems
existing in the sphere of implementation of national tax law in international scale.
The novelty of the thesis is determined by the systematic approach to the
problems of implementation of national tax laws on the interstate level. The thesis
contains an effort to put together analyses of different aspects of fiscal jurisdiction and to
consider the process of interaction among national tax systems.
The main statement (thesis) of my research is: the globalization, development of
e-commerce, and worldwide trade cooperation makes it evident that national fiscal
systems cannot operate separately any more. Thus the role of international law in this
                                                                
3 Stephen G. Utz, Taxation Panel: Tax Harmonization and Coordination in Europe and America, 9 CONN.
J. INT’L L. 767, 767 (1994).
3traditionally domestic branch of law, as tax law, will increase tremendously. We believe
that the international community is now moving towards the creation of an integrated
world tax system. As far as national tax systems began to interact more and more
intensively, they become elements of more general system, which will obtain
characteristics different and independent from ones of particular jurisdiction.
The idea of a world tax system or international tax regime is not shared by
everybody. For instance, David Rosenbloom denies the existence of an international tax
system, because in the real world, only the different tax laws of various countries exist,
and those laws vary greatly from each other.4 But there are supporters. Reuven Avi-
Yonah argues that the network of 1500 or more bilateral treaties that are largely similar in
policy, and even in language, constitutes an international tax regime, which has definable
principles that underlie it and are common to the treaties.5
We would argue that the modern world tax system consists of national tax
systems. These national fiscal jurisdictions constantly interact on bilateral or multilateral
bases. This process of interaction cannot be stopped and it is based on international law.
In order to support this thesis, I address different characteristics of national tax
jurisdictions, which today are vital for their existence. Consequently, the structure of my
thesis reflects the logic of the research, namely, to explore step by step the internal and
external environment of a state’s jurisdiction to tax. The thesis will be divided in four
main parts. The first part (Chapter II) analyzes general characteristics or essence of
national fiscal jurisdiction. The second part (Chapter III) explores the form or limits
                                                                
4 David Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture International Tax Arbitrage and the “International
Tax System”, 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 140-1 (2000).
5 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Commentary on David Rosenbloom’s, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture
International Tax Arbitrage and the “International Tax System”, 53 TAX L. REV. 167, 169 (2000).
4beyond which national jurisdictions cannot go in collection of taxes. The third part
(Chapter IV) is dedicated to the problems, which arises out of conflicts between taxing
authorities of states. The forth part (Chapter V) explores questions of cooperation
between national fiscal jurisdictions.
5CHAPTER 2
DESCRIPTION OF JURISDICTION TO TAX
A. In General
The main purpose of this chapter is to look inside fiscal jurisdiction and to figure
out its essential internal substance and how this substance reflects the necessity of
interstate fiscal cooperation in modern world.
The term jurisdiction is commonly used to describe authority to affect legal
interests.6 In the tax context this authority relates to such functions as establishment and
collection of taxes, including functions relating to resolution of tax disputes and
enforcement in the case of a violation of tax laws.
Fiscal jurisdiction is an attribute of statehood and sovereignty. Jurisdiction is
based on a state’s sovereignty and can be exercised only when a sovereign (i.e. a state)
has the sovereign right to realize appropriate competence under international law. Thus,
we can talk about fiscal sovereignty, which was determined by Swiss Professor of Law
Jean-Marc Rivier as: “Le pouvoir d’édicter des norms de droit fiscal et de les appliquer
                                                                
6 LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW : CASES AND MATERIALS 1088-9 (4th ed. 2001).
6pour lever l’impôt”.7 It means that without sovereignty jurisdiction does not exist.8 Limits
of sovereign power determine limits of jurisdiction. 9
There is no unanimity on the question of limits of tax jurisdiction. On the one
hand, it was stated that jurisdiction can be exercised along with observance of the
principle of substantial and genuine connection10 between the subject matter of
jurisdiction and reasonable interests of the jurisdiction sought to be exercised.11 On the
other hand, based on the territorial character of jurisdiction it was proposed that a state
could impose taxes on any activity by any taxpayer within its territorial scope, regardless
of the extent of the connection of the taxpayer with the state.12
There are two opposing approaches to the question whether a state’s jurisdictions
to tax is limited by international law. The opponents of limitation deny the existence of
any principles of customary international law limiting fiscal jurisdiction. 13
The proponents of limitations insist on the existence of different restrictions,14
including restrictions imposed by customary international law, which deal with
                                                                
7 JEAN MARC RIVIER, DROIT FISCAL SUISSE : LE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 31 (1983).
8 RUTSEL SILVESTRE J. MARTHA,  THE JURISDICTION TO TAX IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE FISCAL JURISDICTION 15 (1986).
9 Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, Extraterritorial Taxation in International Law, in EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 23 (Dr. Karl M. Meessen ed., 1996).
10 E.g., Cornelis Van Raad speaks about four main theories justifying the right of a state to tax aliens.
Under the contractual theory, taxation is regarded as an aspect of a bilateral contract between the State and
the alien taxpayer. Another theory is the ethical theory. In this theory, benefits received from the State, and
the capacity to pay, determine the exercise of sovereign taxing power over aliens. The third theory is the
sovereign theory, in which the right to tax aliens is considered an attribute of (territorial) statehood or
sovereignty. The most important contribution to modern international taxation, however, was the theory of
economic allegiance. In this concept the duty of aliens to pay taxes to the foreign State stems from their
residence, economic activity, or possession of property within the boundaries of that State. CORNELIS VAN
RAAD, NONDISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 20-1 (1986).
11 IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 298.
12 DAVID W. WILLIAMS, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 101 (1991).
13 See Frederick Mann, supra note 13, at 109.
14 E.g., Cornelis van Raad states that with regards to matters of taxation a State’s capacity to tax,
particularly in cases concerning taxation of persons of foreign nationality or residence and of objects
abroad, is subject to general restrictions of various natures. These restrictions can stem from international
and supranational law, or from general rules of domestic law of the State concerned. CORNELIS VAN RAAD,
7immunities, discrimination and confiscation. 15 Some of them determine the scope of
national fiscal jurisdiction more broadly by using notions of economic efficiency, equity,
economic growth, and the influence of static-political thinking. 16
Professor Walter Hellerstein, when speaking about jurisdiction-to-tax issues
regarding indirect taxes, notes that indirect taxes, in contrast to direct taxes, even though
not covered by treaty system, where the world generally agrees about a permanent
establishment as a basis for obligations, are, nevertheless, subject to international norms.
These norms generally require some kind of presence or fixed establishment, but the
standards are not identical from country to country. 17
From the perspective of the present research it seems more justifiable when there
is a connection between jurisdiction and facts.18 It deserves to be supported that an
unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction to tax, for instance, to tax a nonresident alien who is
temporarily present within a state, by measuring his worldwide income, could be
challenged as a violation of international law by both the taxpayer and the state of the
taxpayer’s nationality. 19
                                                                                                                                                                                                
supra note 10, at 19. Silvestre Martha speaks about two elements – fiscal attachment (relationship between
state and fiscal subject or object of taxation) and fiscal liabilities (the scope of a sovereign’s fiscal power),
– which become crucial tests for determining the legitimacy of a state’s jurisdiction in tax matters. Rutsel
Silvestre J. Martha, supra note 9, at 23. She also notices four spheres of validities of national tax orders,
namely: temporal, personal, spatial, and material. Id. at 33-34. Edward Stimson states that a sovereignty’s
legislative power is limited, except as to its citizens located abroad, to persons and property within its own
territory. EDWARD S. STIMSON, JURISDICTION & POWER OF TAXATION 1 (1993).
15 CORNELIS VAN RAAD, supra note 10, at 25.
16 David Gliksberg, The Effect of the Statist-Political Approach to International Jurisdiction of the Income
Tax Regime – the Israeli Case, 15 M ICH. J. INT’L L. 460, 465 (1994).
17 Walter Hellerstein, Roles of States/Provinces in Taxation in the Canada/U.S. Context, 27 CAN.-U.S. L.J.
75, 78 (2001).
18 The authors of a casebook on international law justly wrote: “Under international law, the jurisdiction of
a state depends on the interest that the state, in view of its nature and purposes, may reasonably have in
exercising the particular jurisdiction asserted and on the need to reconcile that interest with the interests of
other states in exercising jurisdiction”. LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 6, at 1090-1.
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 411 (1987).
8When we analyze the legitimacy of jurisdiction we address the rules of customary
or conventional international law. International law plays a significant role in the process
of tax administration in an international scale. First, it legitimizes the exercise of fiscal
jurisdiction; whether it be legislative, executive or adjudicative jurisdiction. Second, it
creates international fiscal law through its law-making process.20
The international legal regime contains different rules concerning the realization
of a state’s jurisdiction. These rules serve as a basis for distinguishing different types of
jurisdiction. We can talk about civil, criminal, monetary and fiscal jurisdiction. 21 Fiscal
jurisdiction is usually divided into three types: jurisdiction to prescribe taxes, jurisdiction
to adjudicate tax cases and jurisdiction to enforce tax law. Depending on the subject
matter of fiscal jurisdiction, we can also talk about jurisdiction over the parties and
jurisdiction over the transactions.22
In national tax regimes there are two general approaches to establishing criteria of
jurisdiction. The first approach is territorial, whereby the existence of relevant tax events
within the territory of a particular state will cause tax liability to accrue in that state. The
second approach is personal, whereby individuals and legal entities are taxed by a
particular state without regard for the territory in which the income was produced.23
                                                                
20 Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, supra note 9, at 31-2.
21 IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 310.
22 JON E. BISCHEL & ROBERT FEINSHREIBER, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 4-5 (2nd ed.
1985).
23 See David Gliksberg, supra note 16, at 460-2. The author points out that territorial approach takes no
account of the identity of the person producing the income is centered on source rules, which determine
whether particular income has been earned within a certain territory. Personal approach based on a link
between the taxpayer and that state which would justify imposing the tax, id. at 460-3.
9B. Types of tax jurisdiction
Jurisdiction to prescribe
Legislative jurisdiction should be defined as a state’s right under international law
to create legal rules.24 In more details, this jurisdiction can be understood as including
authority to make a state’s law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons,
or the interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, be executive act or order, by
administrative rule or regulation, or by determination by a court.25 Legislative jurisdiction
may be extraterritorial. For instance, by customary law, the international system early
recognized the authority of a state to prescribe law for its nationals even when they were
outside its territory. 26
Discussion about limits of prescriptive jurisdiction was noticed in literature.27
Some authors in the field of taxation state that jurisdiction may be asserted in relation to
persons or transactions having a valid nexus with that state28 and this jurisdiction should
be subject to the limitation of reasonableness. But others incline to consider that
                                                                
24 RUTSEL SILVESTRE J. MARTHA, supra note 8, at 64. The author actually notices that the creation of law
can occur either through “vertical prescription”, legislation stricto sensu  (as in the civil law tradition) what
may be called active exercise of legislative jurisdiction, or through “horizontal prescription”, legislation
lato sensu  (as in the common law tradition, in which there is implicitly a basis norm which is the reason of
validity of commonly created law), and may be called the passive exercise of legislative jurisdiction.  In
studying fiscal jurisdiction attention must primarily concentrated on the right of a state to create fiscal law
under international law, id. at 64.
25 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987).
26 Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 HAGUE ACAD. OF INT’L L. 285
(1989).
27 Karl Zemanek, The Legal Foundation of the International System, 226 HAGUE ACAD. OF INT’L L. 71
(1998).
28 SOL PICCIOTTO, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION: A STUDY IN THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
BUSINESS REGULATION 308 (1992).
10
extraterritorial legislation even if it purports to apply to persons or activities abroad, does
not really raise an international problem, as long as it is not forcibly applied abroad.29
Being an attribute of sovereignty, legislative jurisdiction should be based on the
same principles as those in which the sovereignty rests. There are two principle bases for
the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe, namely, territoriality and nationality. However,
an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction on a basis other than nationality is prima facie
illegal, with minor exceptions. Further, jurisdiction based on nationality is secondary, and
in the case of conflict bows to the jurisdiction of the territorial state.30
In the modern integrated world a state cannot make steps without taking into
account possible effect on the interests of other states. We agree that today one can talk
about an international tax regime that is a coherent set of principles that in many ways
constrains the ability of countries to adopt any international tax laws that they please.
This regime is embodied principally in the more than 2,000 existing bilateral tax treaties,
but it also incorporated in the domestic international tax laws of most countries.31
Prescriptive jurisdiction is the primary one among other types of jurisdiction. It
gives start to exercise of judicial and enforcement jurisdiction. There can be no
enforcement jurisdiction unless there is prescriptive jurisdiction. But at the same time
there may be a prescriptive jurisdiction without the possibility of an enforcement
jurisdiction. Thus, jurisdiction hinges, fundamentally, on the power to prescribe.32
                                                                
29 See Karl Zemanek, supra note 27, at 70.
30 Louis Henkin, supra note 26, at 286-7.
31 REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (2002).
32 D. W. Bowett, Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and Resources, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 207 (1998).
11
Jurisdiction to adjudicate
Jurisdiction to adjudicate generally can be described as a competence of
appropriate state’s authorities to resolve tax disputes, or, generally speaking, to subject
persons or things to the process of a state’s courts or administrative tribunals.33 This type
of jurisdiction is not exercised only by the courts, but by tax authorities in the course of
administrative procedure as well.
Judicial jurisdiction is closely connected with jurisdiction to prescribe. As far as
legislative jurisdiction is considered here as having limits under international law the
scope of adjudicative jurisdiction should also have corresponding limitations including
ones belonging exclusively to adjudication. 34
Louis Henkin noted that even when the state has jurisdiction to prescribe – to
declare its law applicable to a particular activity, adjudication – bringing the accused to
trial in the particular circumstances – may nonetheless violate norms of international
law.35 Professor Henkin proposed different tests for the determination of legitimacy of
exercise of jurisdiction to resolve tax disputes. He noticed, in particular, that international
law governing jurisdiction to adjudicate began to move beyond rigid categories of
territoriality and nationality and introduced considerations of reasonableness.36 Further,
he mentioned such criteria as the interests of the territorial state and those of the state of
                                                                
33 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987).
34 For instance, states could exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate on the basis of various links, including
defendant’s presence, conduct, or, in some cases, ownership of property within the state; conduct outside
the state producing certain kind of injury within the state; or the defendant’s nationality, domicile, or
residence in the state. Exercise of judicial jurisdiction on the basis of such links is on the whole accepted as
reasonable; reliance on other bases, such as the nationality of the plaintiff or the presence of property
unrelated to the claim, is generally considered exorbitant. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421 (1987).
35 Louis Henkin, supra note 26, at 310.
36 Id. at 309.
12
the nationality of the persons subject to the law, as well as human values, ordinarily
considerations of fairness to the persons affected.37
Adjudicative jurisdiction relates mostly to procedural questions of the choice of
competent forum. Usually disputes involving private parties are to be resolved in national
courts. In general, foreign nationals paying taxes in a foreign country have access to the
judicial system of that country to resolve disputes about taxation.
It is not the case, when tax disputes arise between sovereigns. Alvin Warren says
that there is no international adjudicatory body with the authority to resolve such
disputes. He notices that the specific character of resolution of interstate tax disputes is
determined by diplomatic rather than legal procedure of that resolution in the sense that it
is up to the representatives of the two countries to come to agreement. A few bilateral tax
treaties and regional agreement provide for arbitration, but binding dispute settlement
remains the exception in international taxation. Disputes between the contracting parties
about the application of the tax treaties are commonly to be resolved by mutual
agreement between the competent authorities of each country, which are generally tax
agencies of each government.38
Based on the particularity of tax disputes resolution between sovereigns Professor
Robert Green calls its procedure antilegalistic. He supports his statement by the fact that
under most tax treaties, consultations and negotiations between designated tax officials of
the two treaty countries are the exclusive means for resolving disputes. There is no
assurance, he says, that this process actually will produce a resolution. Even if it does, the
resolution is likely to represent a political compromise rather than a reasoned decision
                                                                
37 Id. at 308.
13
based on the application of legal rules and the resolution of such disputes likely will
require resort to diplomatic channels.39
But not everybody excludes the possibility of resolution of interstate tax disputes
by neutral authority. For examples, authors of a book about tax arbitration consider it
possible for the International Court of Justice to form from time to time one or more
chambers, for dealing with particular categories of cases, e.g. tax cases.40 They even go
further and argue that it may be advisable to work with arbitration commissions as an
intermediate stage. Their argumentation is based on the assumption that an arbitration
procedure involves many practical questions, which can most easily be dealt with by a
permanent body. A permanent operating institute, in its turn, would lend a certain
stability to the arbitration procedure.41
The territorial character of sovereignty determines the limit of sovereignty and
comprises the power of a state to exercise the supreme authority over all persons and
things within its territory. 42 This territorial restriction in the procedure of tax dispute
resolution can distort fair decision in cases where foreign element is involved. That is
why adjudicative jurisdiction of a particular state should be more cooperative in the
international context. This inevitably demands not only cooperation between courts and
other competent authorities at the stage of case hearing, but also cooperation between
legislatures in passing appropriate procedural laws, as well as cooperation on the level of
enforcement. This outcome is based on the fact that the exercise of jurisdiction by courts
                                                                                                                                                                                                
38 Alvin C. Warren, Income Tax Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131, 140
(2001).
39 Robert A. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between Governments: A Comparison
of the International Tax and Trade Regimes, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 79, 137 (1998).
40 GUSTAF LINDENCRONA & NILS MATTSON, ARBITRATION IN TAXATION 16 (1981).
41 Id. at 17-18.
42 Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, supra note 9, at 23.
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of one state that affects interests of other states is now generally considered as coming
within the domain of customary international law and international agreement.43
Jurisdiction to enforce
Jurisdiction to enforce is defined by the Restatement (Third) as the authority of a
state “to employ judicial or nonjudicial measurers to induce or compel compliance or
punish non-compliance with its laws or regulations, provided it has jurisdiction to
prescribe”. 44
In the international dimension the governing principle is a principle of territorial
limitation on enforcement,45 which means that a state cannot take measures on the
territory of another state by way of enforcement of national laws without of the consent
of latter. Consequently, tax investigation may not be mounted on the territory of another
state, except under the terms of a treaty or other consent given. 46
Besides territorial limitations, enforcement of national law abroad is subject to
additional legal limitations because in particular circumstances it might implicate the
interests of another state.47 First, a state may enforce its law – whether through courts or
otherwise – only if it has jurisdiction to prescribe the law sought to be enforced. Second,
enforcement measures are exercises of jurisdiction, and under international law are
subject to the requirement of reasonableness.48
Professor Henkin made three suggestions about enforcement jurisdiction, which,
really, ought to be meet with little opposition.
                                                                
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421 (1987).
44 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 431 (1987).
45 SOL PICCIOTTO, supra note 28, at 308.
46 IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 307.
15
1. No state may exercise enforcement jurisdiction outside its own territory in the
absence of its own legislature authorizing it to do so, that is to say, in the absence of
legislative jurisdiction.
2. The mere existence of legislative jurisdiction is insufficient to justify the state to
exercise enforcement jurisdiction in another state’s territory.
3. The mere fact that a state can enforce its legislation within its own territory and in this
sense has enforcement jurisdiction, does not mean that it is necessarily has legislative
jurisdiction, and does not therefore render the enforcement valid in public
international law. 49
Enforcement abroad demands not only a valid basis for jurisdiction and accidental
consent in a particular case, but also involves the problem of comity in international
relations. Unfortunately, long-standing international practice has denied the application
of comity in the case of attempts to litigate to enforce the tax laws of another country.
This statement is supported by practice of the courts. In Milwaukee County v. M.E. White
Co.50 the Supreme Court stated that there is exception to the rule of recognition of the tax
obligation because the courts of one state should not be called upon to scrutinize the
relations of foreign state with its own citizens, such as are involved in its revenue laws.51
In Government of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491, the plaintiff sought to prove before
English courts an Indian tax claim in the course of liquidation of an English company.
Enforcement of revenue claim was denied. In a Canadian case, United States v. Harden,
[1963] Can. Sup. Ct. 366, 41 D.L.R.2d 721, the court denied enforcement to a consent
                                                                                                                                                                                                
47 Louis Henkin, supra note 26, at 277.
48 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 431 (1987).
49 Frederick Mann, supra note 13, at 34-5.
50 Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
16
judgment of a United States district court rendered on a claim for taxes. The Supreme
Court of Canada held that a foreign cause of action did not merge into the foreign
judgment and that a foreign revenue claim would not be enforced directly or indirectly. 52
In Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson53 the
court affirmed the dismissal of appellant Canadian province's action to collect a tax
judgment from a Canadian court issued against appellee individuals for failure to state a
claim on which relief could be granted because the court determined that the revenue
rule, which provided that courts of one jurisdiction did not recognize the revenue laws of
another jurisdiction, applied and prevented the courts from enforcing foreign tax
judgments. This position of the court is clearly predictable because in section 483 of the
Restatement (Third) one can find the rule that courts in the United States are not required
to recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties
rendered by the courts of other states.54
These enforcement problems determine the main shortcomings of national tax
systems. Even developed countries find it hard to effectively enforce residence-based
taxation on the global income of individuals, especially from tax havens, and developing
countries find this task impossible. As portfolio investment grows and becomes
increasingly more mobile, this problem becomes more and more acute. Source-based
taxation of income is much more effective than residence-based taxation because the
source country has information needed to enforce the tax of it wishes to do so.55
                                                                                                                                                                                                
51 Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 275 (1935).
52 HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIAL AND TEXT , 722-3 (4th ed.
1994).
53 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d. 1161 (9th
Cir. 1979).
54 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 483 (1987).
55 Reuven Avi-Yonah, supra note 2, at 1336.
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One should take into account that the enforcement function is performed not only
under adjudication, but also under administrative process. International law has begun to
address also executive or administrative enforcement that is not ancillary to adjudication
but often is a substitute for it, when such enforcement impinges on interests of other state
and their nationals.56 Unlike judicial enforcement, which has developed a body of
jurisprudence and guidelines, international law relating to non-judicial enforcement is
still primitive and inchoate. But the underlying principles are clear. The limitations on the
exercise of jurisdiction to enforce by non-judicial means reflects concern for
reasonableness, fairness to affected private interests, entitlement for due process, as well
as proportionality and appropriateness of the penalties to violation. 57 As a compensation
of the limits of the judicial enforcement jurisdiction and as an example of nonjudicial
enforcement we can consider the provisions of national laws concerning withholding
taxes.
From the perspective of these weak points of enforcement jurisdiction from the
recent perspective of globalization the reluctance of states to cooperate in enforcement of
tax law seems obsolete. We agree with the commentators of the Restatement when they
doubt that judgments of foreign courts for payments of taxes cannot be enforced in the
United States if such enforcement is consistent with general rules of international law on
recognition of foreign judgments.58
The need for cooperation becomes more urgent and should follow the
development of means of conducting business. For example, today enforcement and
compliance are the principal concerns about the way in which the Internet affects the
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income taxation, because it increases opportunities to engage in moneymaking activities
offshore and, in effect, creates opportunities for the so-called “black market economy” to
be accessed much more easily than it was in the past.59
Unless the rules of international law governing interstate tax enforcement issues
develop, it would, however, be reasonable to start unilaterally to collect taxes of other
states hoping that the respective foreign state will then do likewise.60 This proposal
sounds promising because it helps, actually, to break up the circle, as far as states cannot
reasonably be expected to collect taxes of other states where mutuality is lacking.
C. Sub-national tax jurisdiction
The problem of sub-national jurisdiction arises in the federal states, especially in
those where the members of federation have broad competence and even are considered
as quasi-sovereign. This means that in situations where a federal state is involved, it is
necessary to consider the jurisdictional questions not only of these two states but also
jurisdictional competence of federal units.
Professor Walter Hellerstein squarely addressed this issue in his article about the
competence of states and provinces in, respectively, the United States and Canada. He
underlined three structural sources of friction that arise out of sub-national taxing power
in a federal system. The first source of friction is the existence of different rules at the
national and sub-national levels. The second source of friction is different restraints on
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sub-national and national behavior. The third source of friction is that there tend to be
more sub-national governments than national governments (the mere existence of the of a
multiplicity of rules itself causes friction).61
These frictions may have negative effects on the international obligations of
federal government. In particular, professor Hellerstein states that direct tax treaties do
not govern sub-national governments62 and therefore there are some limitations on the
national level, but at the sub-national level there are virtually no limitations at all.63 To
support his statement he turns to the case where Florida imposed a tax on the sale of fuel
to airlines.64 In this case the court held that the agreement did not preempt state regulation
because the provision did not explicitly bind the states. Treating these national
agreements as not binding sub-national jurisdictions the court, according to author
factually said, “Look, Congress did not say anything about this. Indeed, by excluding
states from this prohibition, Congress presumably approved this.”65
It seems that such situations do not contribute to the development of stable and
predictable international tax cooperation. It is the responsibility of federal government to
secure that any international tax conventions it signs will remain in force over the entire
territory of the federation. International tax cooperation should not be complicated by
possible jurisdictional competence of a state’s unit in international scale. We think that
relations between federal center and federal regions should remain of internal character
and not attract international concern.
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D. Inferences
In conclusion, we believe that understanding the necessity of interjurisdictional
cooperation becomes more and more apparent. The growing international fiscal relations
should result in the existence of a coherent international tax regime that enjoys nearly
universal support and that underlies the complexities of the international aspects of
individual country’s tax systems. The existence of this regime shows that despite each
country’s claim to sovereignty in tax matters, it is possible to reach an internationally
acceptable consensus that will be followed by the majority of the world’s taxing
jurisdictions. This international tax regime, based on voluntary consensus, can be
regarded as one of the major achievements of twentieth-century international law. 66
The general principle set forth in this chapter demonstrates that the analysis of
features of three types of jurisdiction leads to the conclusion, that a particular state can
effectively administer its tax law only within its territory. When a foreign element is
involved in tax relations the national tax system often loses its logical completeness and
even becomes helpless. The toothlessness of domestic tax laws outside a state’s borders
explicitly makes it necessary to establish the network or system of national fiscal
jurisdictions.
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CHAPTER 3
BASES OF JURISDICTION TO TAX
A. In General
The main purpose of this chapter is to explore the forms or limiting bases beyond
which national jurisdiction cannot go in collection of taxes. If in the previous chapter it
was stated that the essence of fiscal jurisdiction in modern world does not provide with
sufficient qualities in tax administration, in this chapter it is stated that the form of
jurisdiction to tax also demands international cooperation for effective functioning.
In presenting research into the bases of jurisdiction, it is that understood different
facts that justify the exercise of fiscal competence. As will be shown below these bases
are usually of a uniform and limiting character and provide tax competence with
legitimacy under international law. Going beyond widely recognized bases exposes a
state’s fiscal competence to the danger of being deemed illegal.
Two main forms of fiscal attachment follow jurisdictional bases. The term “fiscal
attachment”, serves to explain the relationship between the holder of fiscal jurisdiction
(the state) and the fiscal subject or object of taxation, which determines the legality of the
exercise of fiscal jurisdiction. The first form is personal fiscal attachment, which is based
on residence or nationality, and the second form is economic fiscal attachment, which
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occurs in case of short of residence.67 These kinds of attachments reflect the general
division of the income tax base between the country of source and the country of
residence, and this division is considered as a principal function of international income
tax system. 68
Among the facts that justify fiscal attachment, those usually mentioned are
nationality, domicile or residence, presence or doing business within the country, location
within the country of property or transactions from which income is derived69, which
represent necessary nexus between subjects or objects and a state.70
The modern states use a typical set of jurisdictional bases for tax purposes.
Generally, source of income and residence of taxpayer are the common bases.71 Source-
basis taxation depends, more or less, on the proposition that the country where income
originates has a legitimate claim to tax that income. Residence-basis taxation relies on the
notion that the country where taxpayer resides legitimately may impose tax in order to
support the normal government activities that residents enjoy. 72 Most countries rely on
                                                                
67 Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, supra note 9, at 25.
68 Alvin C. Warren, supra note 38, at 132.
69 CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS,
TEXT AND PROBLEMS 14 (2nd ed. 2001).
70 See CORNELIS VAN RAAD, supra note 10, at 20-21. Johan Schipper argues that there is international
unanimity of opinion on the point that certain economic ties should connect the non-resident to a country in
order that it may levy a tax upon his income. There would also, in so far as we can see, be agreement on the
proposition that the nexus between the non-resident and the country concerned should be pertinent to the
income, which the country seeks to tax.  JOHAN H. T. SCHIPPER, supra note 94, at 208.
71 See David H. Rosenbloom, Taxing the Income of Foreign Controlled Corporations, 26 BROOKLYN J.
INT’L L. 1525, 1532 (2001). Restatement (Third) defines several bases for jurisdiction to tax. Such
jurisdiction over persons could be based on nationality, domicile, or residence, as well as such facts as
presence or doing business, or ownership of property. Jurisdiction also can be exercised over property
within its territory, or transaction connected to the territory. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 411 (1987).
72 David Gliksberg justifies this approach by stating that personal jurisdiction is based on a statist
conception that the state has the right to tax its citizens and residents, because the center of the state is not
its territory but its population. The focus on person, rather than on territory, means that a taxpayer who
complies with the personal link becomes liable for tax imposed by the state of residence, even though he
did not produce the income there, because he is bound to participate in financing that government’s
expenditure. Such participation is derived from the fact that residence implies that the taxpayer belongs to a
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both source taxation and residence taxation for their income tax base, and there is really
no need to choose between these two jurisdictional grounds. A “mixed” system is
common, justifiable, and reasonable.73 It was even stated that that source and residence
taxation, if not also citizenship taxation, now constitute customary norms.74
In this chapter the logic of research follows the general types of fiscal attachment.
In the part concerning personal fiscal attachment two bases will be considered, namely,
nationality and residence. In the other part, which relates to economic fiscal attachment,
the absence of strong connection between taxpayer and a taxing state determined study of
such bases as place of activity (including questions of permanent establishment), source
of income, and situs of property. There is also another part dedicated to taxation issues in
e-commerce, because absence of geography and personality raises problems of
reconsidering traditional approaches.
B. Personal fiscal attachment
Personal fiscal attachment assumes a personal relationship between the taxpayer
and the country. For example, a country may wish to tax any ind ividual who is either a
citizen or a resident of the country. The concept of personal relationship also applies to
corporations and other types of entities. A corporation may be considered a citizen of the
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country in which it is organized. Similarly, a corporation can be considered a resident of
the country in which its seat of management or principal place of business is located.75
Nationality
The principle of nationality as a proper jurisdictional basis has been under
constant criticism, and there are several respectable authors who advocate the banning of
citizenship as a factor constituting fiscal attachment. However, if the view is taken that
jurisdiction is an attribute of sovereignty and that originally sovereignty comprised
basically two dimensions, a personal and a spatial dimensions, it becomes logical that
jurisdiction based on nationality is as valid as jurisdiction based on territoriality. 76 This
proposition was well elaborated by professor Mann, who stated that as between the
national and his home country no problem of jurisdiction arises.77
It is common view today that notwithstanding the questioning of nationality as a
proper basis for fiscal attachment, from an international law perspective, a state is fully
entitled to tax its nationals wherever they may be.78 Nationality is also increasingly
asserted as a basis for jurisdiction for a state’s direct taxes over legal persons. The state of
nationality, in this sense, is taken as the state of the laws of which give legal personality
to a non-individual person, for example a company or partnership. Nationality is now the
prevalent approach to asserting jurisdiction over such taxpayers.79
A few states use nationality as a basis of taxation. In this context the U.S.
experience in taxing their nationals deserves special attention. The United States
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attributed overwhelming importance to the personal aspect and the personal link of
citizenship was regarded in this country as a solid foundation for tax liability, based on
the political outlook, which attached great importance to the concept of citizenship as a
fundamental component of the state. This approach differs markedly from that of the vast
majority of other countries that do not tax unrepatriated foreign earnings of citizens
residing or domiciled abroad.80 The most prominent expression of this is in the judgment
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Cook v. Tait where the Court stated:
“In other words, the principle was declared that the government, by its very
nature, benefits the citizen and his property wherever found and, therefore, has the
power to make the benefit complete. Or to express it another way, the basis of the
power to tax was not and cannot be made depended upon the status of the
property in all cases, it be in or out of the United States, and is not and cannot be
made dependent upon domicile of the citizen, that being in or out of the United
States, but upon his relationship as a citizen to the United States and the
relationship of the latter to him as a citizen.”81
                                                                                                                                                                                                
78 Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, supra note 9, at 24.
79 DAVID W. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 104.
80 CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 68, at 32.
81 Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924).
26
Nationality as jurisdictional basis can easily be the course of extraterritorial
application of national tax law. Such application causes double taxation and even could
lead to tax migration. Exercise of jurisdiction on nationality basis poses question of fair
allocation of taxing competence between state of nationality and state of residence. This
distribution can be achieved only in the course of international cooperation either on
bilateral or multilateral level.
Residence
Tax jurisdiction based on residence of the taxpayer can impose fiscal liability
upon nationals, aliens as well as legal entities. David Rosenbloom argues, that it is
possible, without much effort, to defend the residence basis as a jurisdictional ground for
income taxation, because it fits nicely within all criteria of a good and proper income tax,
does no violence to international understandings, and probably should be used by any
country that has a formal income tax. 82 Professor Peggy B. Musgrave shares this position
stating that national right to tax the global income of residents is recognized in
international law and the exercise of tax sovereignty over foreign source income is
necessary to achieve equitable tax treatment of resident taxpayers by making all income,
wherever earned, subject to tax, consistent with the accretion principle.83 The use of
residence basis and as a result the taxation of corporation and natural persons on their
worldwide income is mostly found in the practice of industria lized countries.84
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In modern times, most countries have imposed income taxes on individuals who
bear a personal relationship to the taxing country in form of residence. Residence is
differently defined in national tax laws but generally it assumes that the individual is
living in the country on a more or less permanent or continuing basis. Double taxation
agreements have not had a significant harmonizing effect on the national criteria of
residence, as these agreements usually employ the domestic residence definitions of the
contracting states. Only if domestic residence rules conflict, do these agreements usually
apply independent criteria for the determination of treaty residence. But in any way
residents fall within the class of those who “consume” governmental services and
therefore must help bear the cost.85
Residence has long been considered as a valid basis under international law for
the taxation of aliens.86 This means that resident aliens may be subjected to tax not only
on the income within the State of residence, but also on income from outside that state.87
In general, under international law, the taxation of aliens should be subjected to the
criterion of presence within the territory of such state. Without such territorial link no
characterization as resident would be lawful, because residence under international law
presence is considered as the conditio sine qua non for exercising residence basis
taxation. 88
In the case of determining the residence of companies and particularly
multinational corporations it becomes a little harder to know just where its home can be
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said to be. It can be assumed that transnational business entities consume governmental
services all over the world. In many cases, perhaps, it is clear that its consumption if far
greater in one country than in the others; but often this is debatable. Nor is it clear even
whether the relative rates of consumption can accurately determined.89 Usually residence
of a company refers in a much more general way to the link of a body corporate with a
State. These links range between two extremes, the place of incorporation and the place
where the activities are carried on. 90
Residence-based fiscal jurisdiction also raises questions of equity in tax matters.
Some authors consider residence-basis taxation as preferable because it enables greater
inter-taxpayer equity. 91 Others do not agree that a taxpayer’s entire income necessarily
needs to be taxed by a single country – the residence country. 92
As in case of nationality basis jurisdiction, the residence-basis jurisdiction uses an
extraterritorial approach as far as such jurisdiction seeks to tax worldwide income.
Taxation of worldwide income, in part concerning income earned abroad inevitably
overlaps with jurisdictional right of a foreign state where that income was originated. In
this situations two interested states should interact and cooperate in order to prevent
excessive taxation. In modern mobile world the states cannot exercise their taxing
competence without taking into account interests of another tax sovereigns and taxpayers.
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C. Economic fiscal attachment
Place of activity and the concept of permanent establishment
This basis applies to so called active income. In this case the foreign person or
entity, though not resident, is present in the taxing country in some meaningful way.
Typically, this presence exists in the way of engaging in the conduct of business activity
in the taxing country. This kind of source jurisdiction is a sort of in personam
jurisdiction, based upon the participation by the foreign enterprise in the source country’s
economy.93
Usually foreign entities doing business abroad are taxed in the foreign country to
the extent that they have permanent establishment in that foreign country. The concept of
permanent establishment justifies the fiscal attachment short of residence of juristic
persons and is commonly understood to be a fixed place of business through which the
business of an enterprise is partly or wholly is carried on. 94 The criterion of the exercise
of a trade or business within the country through a permanent establishment, defined
along the lines customary to most international treaties, constitutes a much more
acceptable and workable test for subjecting non-residents to taxation in so far as it fully
takes into account the requirements of both clarity and sharp limitation and the existence
of definite ties of sufficient moment and permanency as an indication that the non-
resident forms part of the economic and social structure of the country in question. 95
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The notion of permanent establishment is one of the most important issues in
treaty-based international fiscal law. This statement is confirmed by the fact that virtually
all modern tax treaties use permanent establishment as the main instrument to establish
taxing jurisdiction over a foreigner’s unincorporated business activities.96 The most
important and obvious effect, both from a legal and practical point of view, is that the
permanent establishment principle under the tax treaties is decisive for allocation of
taxing jurisdiction over unincorporated business activities with economic allegiance to
more than one country. 97
Despite the fact that the permanent establishment principle is used in all tax
treaties in force today, this concept is still not part of customary international law. If not
included in a treaty, the permanent establishment principle is not applicable.98
Under tax treaties various exceptions apply, inter alia, to bus iness activities
abroad connected with foreign permanent establishments and to business real property
located abroad, to holding foreign shares and to lending and licensing to a foreign party.
For taxation purposes, in these latter instances the situs or source is assumed to be
situated in the foreign state concerned.99
The concept of a permanent establishment as found in the tax treaties provisions
is a good example of how two countries can allocate between each other tax base. This
allocation, actually, represents self-restraints in tax sovereignty and understanding that in
an integrated world national tax policies should be subjected to some forms of
international coordination. The network of such tax treaties is the strong sign of existence
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of international tax system, which is based on the principle if fair distribution of tax
revenues among states.
Source of income
This part deals with so called passive income. The set of persons deriving income
from sources within a country includes not only citizens and residents (those persons who
already have a personal relationship with the country), but also foreign persons who are
neither citizens nor residents of taxing country. 100 Most countries claim their entitlement
to tax the income arising within their borders but accruing to foreign investors. Here the
underlying theory appears to be that the source country has contributed to the ability of
the foreign taxpayer to derive the income in question, and this justifies invoking the cost-
sharing rule.101
In this case, the foreign taxpayer has no “personal” contact with the taxing
country at all but derives particular items of income – most often investment income,
such as dividends, interest or royalties – which are thought to have their source in the
taxing country. This invokes a kind in rem jurisdiction based upon the particular items of
income involved and imposed without regard to any “status” relationship of the recipient
to the taxing country or any active participation in its economy.102
In international tax conventions the question of entitlement to tax at source is the
bedrock. The right of a jurisdiction to tax all income arising within its geographical
borders is recognized as of fundamental character. This permits a country to share in the
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gains of foreign-owned factors of production operating within its borders; gains which
are generated in cooperation with its own factors, whether they be natural resources, an
educated and/or low cost work force, or the proximity of the market. The tax revenue so
obtained may be thought of as a national return to the leasing of these complementary
factors to non-resident investors or temporary workers, or, such taxation may be thought
of in benefit terms, as a quid pro quo payment for cost-reducing, profit-enhancing
services provided by the host country. 103
The main problem today is that the national legislations differ considerably with
regard to the definition of domestic source income, which raises questions of
extraterritoriality in their right. Besides the fact that taxation of foreign income is
inherently extraterritorial, the problem of extraterritoriality is exacerbated by the fact that
no established universal rule of conventional or customary international law exists
concerning the delimitation between domestic source income and foreign source income,
or even the attribution of income to the particular taxpayers.104
The use of source of income basis can inevitably lead to double taxation if income
earned within a particular state is accrued to foreigners, which are personally taxed by
another country on residence or nationality basis. The exercise of fiscal jurisdiction based
on source of income will not be followed by double taxation only in the case where
international tax conventions exist. It means that most countries prefer peaceful tax
coexistence rather than severe tax competition. This tax coexistence presumes application
of internationally recognized rules of the game, which are attributable to the international
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tax regime and, thus, can be considered as characteristics of international tax system as
different of characteristics of national tax systems.
Property
That the possession of property, if it has not merely a temporary character, is a
legitimate and, indeed, very usual source of taxation by the state of the situs cannot be
open to doubt.105 In respect of the taxation of such foreign-owned property, the situs of
this property within the territorial limits of a state is recognized as a connection to that
state that suffices as a basis for that state to tax the property and the income it produces.
However, the question, for tax purposes, of a property’s exact location is relatively
unexplored and, where explored, is not uniformly answered in national and international
tax instruments.106
A state has fiscal jurisdiction only if the situs of the object is within its territorial
sphere of validity. 107 No state can legally establish an economic fiscal attachment with
respect to property located beyond its scope.108
The problem of economic attachment becomes more difficult with respect to
movables. It is clear that whenever a movable is within the territorial sphere of validity of
a state, such state can apply its legal categories on the object, irrespective the owner’s
location. On the other hand, the state of the owner’s nationality or residence can attach
the owner personally and tax the revenues derived from the movable property. However,
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the latter state cannot attach the movable itself. Thus every state can impose taxes on
goods, which are present within their territories, be they transitory or permanent.109
But this proposition concerning the possibility to establish fiscal jurisdiction over
movable property, which is of transitory character, should be backed by the existence of
reasonable economic nexus with taxing state. Without such nexus, as it was discussed in
the second chapter no jurisdiction to prescribe taxes can be accepted as legal. In the case
of movable transient goods the country of destination has a strong justification for their
taxation. And, thus, the country where property is temporarily located should take into
account international consideration and behave on comity basis expecting that other
countries will restrain from taxing of transient movable property heading to that country.
D. E-commerce: absence of territory and personality
Electronic commerce is the ability to perform transactions involving the exchange
of goods or services between two or more parties using electronic tools and techniques.110
E-commerce is relatively new area of taxation, which has largely been immune from
significant tax regulation. Most world governments have not yet instituted firm tax
guidelines regarding electronic commerce over the Internet.111 Before taxation of e-
commerce is introduced the relative unanimity on the question of nature of Internet
transactions should be achieved.112
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In the process of prescribing tax law upon e-commerce it is necessary to keep in
mind that the taxation of commerce conducted over the Internet should be consistent with
the established principles of international taxation, should avoid inconsistent national tax
jurisdictions and double taxation, and should be simple and easy to understand.113
One of the main problems of e-commerce taxation under international and
municipal law is the determination of the place with which appropriate taxable events are
connected. In other words, Internet transactions raise the critical issue of geographic
jurisdiction because taxation and regulation are subject of geographical jurisdiction.
Geography simply does not map on cyberspace. The reality is that the transaction did not
take place in any geographic location. 114
As we discussed above, the nexus between taxing state and tax events should exist
for the purpose of legitimate jurisdiction to impose taxes. One of the kinds of nexus is the
presence within the territory of a state sought tax authority. E-commerce creates taxation
problem when the only presence that exists in a transaction is a company’s server in the
foreign country. Professor Richard Doernberg argues that the flow of information from
company to server to end customer is not enough of a physical presence for a country to
claim the right to tax. 115
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The general question of determination of the geographical location of the taxable
event raises the question of permanent establishment. Right now one of the burning
debates in the area of e-commerce is whether a server constitutes a permanent
establishment.116 The question whether a server or website owned or used by a foreign
enterprise amounts to a fixed place of business in a particular country may result in
modification to the definition of permanent establishment and clarification of what is
excluded from its scope.117
From the one point of view, the presence of a server may be disregarded when it
is only a communication device, not a true business location. Usage of facilities for the
purpose of storage, display, or delivery of goods or merchandise does not create a
permanent establishment. Nor do preparatory or auxiliary activities. The further a foreign
corporation goes beyond advertising, collection of information, and purchasing of goods,
the more likely it will be deemed to have permanent establishment.118
From the other point of view, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has expressed
its concern in statement: “It is possible that such a server, or similar equipment, is not a
sufficiently significant element in the creation of certain types of income to be taken into
account for purposes of determining whether a U.S. trade or bus iness exists. It is also
possible that if the existence of a U.S.-based server is taken into account for this purpose,
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foreign persons will simply utilize servers located outside the United States since the
server’s location is irrelevant”. 119
The OECD determined its position on this question and said that the server on
which the web site is stored and through which it is accessible is a piece of equipment
having physical location and such location my thus constitute a “fixed place of business”
of the enterprise that operates that server. In order to constitute a fixed place of business,
a server will need to be located at a certain place for a sufficient period of time, and to
perform core functions for a particular enterprise.120
E-commerce not only introduced geographical problems but also some others.
One of them is the problem of identification of proper taxpayers. Actually, Internet-
mediated activities emphatically present on very fundamental question: Over whom and
what can a government legitimately exercise power?121 The other fundamental question,
certainly, is whether government revenues will remain adequate.122
As far as cyberspace cannot be geographically divided the major problems of e-
commerce taxation should be addressed on multinational basis and by uniform rules.123
For example, we agree that concepts such as permanent establishment and carrying on
business will be more difficult to apply unless governments agree to a common set of
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rules to determine how Web-based transactions will be subject to tax. 124 We also think,
that international organizations such as the OECD or the UN 125 can develop multilateral
treaties that apply to those engaged in a significant amount of electronic commerce to
answer many unresolved questions with respect to classification of income and
jurisdictional issues.126
E. Inferences
We think that Professor Nancy Kaufman reasonably said that in meaningful
international tax cooperation it would be possible for each country with which a taxpayer
had ties to impose its tax on that portion of the taxpayer’s income arising within that
country. In that event, she continues, the taxpayer’s entire comprehensive income tax
base would be subject to tax, different parts of it by different countries. A worldwide tax
system of source taxation would thus achieve the income tax goal to which we all seem to
subscribe: an income tax should apply to a taxpayer’s entire income, wherever earned or
derived. In her view, equity does not necessarily require the taxation of the taxpayer’s
worldwide income by a single sovereign, and she doesn’t agree that personal taxes are
inappropriate to a situation in which only part of the taxpayer’s global income is taxed.127
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The analysis of this chapter reveals that national means of tax law administration
should be depended on the bases of limited character. When a particular state tries to
broaden its jurisdictional basis it inevitably overlaps with tax bases established by another
country. The absence of international coordination of interstate allocation of tax bases
and different vision of limits of own jurisdiction both lead to conflicts between
jurisdictions.
40
CHAPTER 4
CONFLICTS BETWEEN TAX JURISDICTIONS
A. In general
Professor David Gliksberg distinguishes three basic models of conflicts between
concurrent jurisdictions of different states: conflict between personal jurisdictions,
conflict between territorial jurisdictions, and conflict between personal and territorial
jurisdictions. According to him, conflict between personal jurisdictions occurs where a
particular taxpayer has personal links, which create a liability for tax imposed by two or
more states (e.g. residence and citizenship). Conflict between territorial jurisdictions, he
continues, will occur where each territorial jurisdictions has a different source rule
determining the geographical source of income, so that a number of territorial
jurisdictions demand tax for the same event. Finally, he states, that conflict between
territorial and personal jurisdictions is the most frequent conflict, occurring where certain
income was incurred in one state (state of source) by a taxpayer who maintains personal
ties with another state, which create a tax liability in that state (state of residence or
citizenship). Such a conflict is regulated by tax treaty or by unilateral provisions of
national law. 128
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Of course, there are other approaches to classification of types of sovereign fiscal
conflicts129, but they are all based on the fact that such conflicts arise out of the situation
when one tax event is subjected to jurisdictional basis of more than one state inevitably
leads to conflicts between sovereigns. As we have seen in previous chapters fiscal
jurisdictions of different states are not harmonized. As a result, tax bases or limits of
jurisdictions to tax of particular countries often overlap.
As matter of fact the conflict arises when two concurrent jurisdictions are legally
entitled under international law to apply their laws to the same facts. As the causes of
conflict can be mentioned the cases of double nationality, double residence or a
combination of the two. It also takes place when either a resident or national of a given
state has property or some kind of interest within the territory of another state.130
Unfortunately, in modern international law there are no commonly accepted rules
for resolution of fiscal conflicts, as a result a comprehensive concept is lacking, and
procedures, which pretend to settle actual conflicts, are, in reality, lop-sided. There is not
even agreement on the fundamental issue whether states are free to exercise jurisdiction
as long as this is not expressly prohibited by a rule of international law or whether they
may only exercise jurisdiction abroad on the basis of enabling rules of international
law.131 Nor does general international law adequately deal with the disparity between
fiscal concepts, such as the definitions of income, permanent establishment, residence,
etc.132
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The existing conflicts between states concerning tax matters are the object of
discussion between scientists. The fundamental problem here is the contradiction
between the absence of formal rules of international rules dealing with such conflicts,
thus, giving rise to unilateral national approach to enactment of national tax laws, and
interdependence of modern world, which determines international approach to formation
of national tax systems along with consideration of interests of other countries.
Professor Sol Picciotto when addressed this issue justly mentioned that from the
point of view of formal sovereignty, there is no restriction on a state’s right to tax, and it
may be exercised without regard to its effects on other states.133 At the same time,
according to him, since economic activities and social relations are international or
global, the reality of state power is not unlimited exclusive sovereignty, but interrelated
and overlapping jurisdictions. Even, he concludes, if states exercise their own exclusive
territorial competence this could produce overlapping and conflicting effects, due to the
multiple geographic contacts of individuals and interrelated economic activities.134
In the absence of international legal mechanism for prevention of tax conflicts the
problems of finding compromise becomes more deep in relations between economic
interests of developing and developed countries. It is debatable what principles should be
regarded as fundamental in the context of relationships between developed and
developing countries. In such relations traditional requirements of equity and neutrality
are not always handle the problem adequately. The main point here is that tax incentives
provided by developing countries in order to attract investments in reality constitute
deviations from the principle of equity and neutrality. Thus, coordination of the tax
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incentives of developing countries and international taxation is, however, a subject area
for which the standard argumentation based solely on these two concepts turns to be
inadequate. In discussions concerning issues relating to developing countries, the
economic sovereignty of each nation is often regarded as a fundamental principle.135
Consequently, in this case we see that the developing world is increasing to use national
rather than international approach to institute their tax systems.
In this chapter I will address first the problems of tax competition as a direct
result of absence of the legal mechanism of resolution of conflicts between fiscal
jurisdictions. Then I examine the tax haven issue, which can be considered as the extreme
form of tax competition. After that I will turn to the analysis of the consequences of the
tax competition.
B. Tax Competition
Professor Stephen Utz has described tax competition as both the deliberate
attempt by a taxing sovereign to offer tax advantages to mobile taxpayers in order to
attract them to its jurisdiction, and the unintended creation of such attractions. According
to him, the examples of deliberate tax competition are few among the more advanced
industrial democracies, as far as they can rarely achieve overall economic gains by
flaunting the interests of their many trading partners, but examples of apparently
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unintended or indirect tax competition are abundant.136 As an example of indirect tax
competition we can mention tax exemptions for interest on certain deposits.
There are different approaches towards tax competition. According to one view,
tax competition is a strong factor in both maintaining and increasing the vibrancy of
economies across the globe. The proponents of such approach argue that tax competition
helps to reduce ineffective governmental expenses and criticize the OECD for trying to
impose its will on nations that are not members of the organization by calling for
draconian sanctions against so-called tax havens.137 According to other more neutral
approaches, tax competition as such is neither good nor bad. It can conceivably eliminate
economic distortion due to national tax laws but it can also undermine the legitimate
goals of supporting government and stabilizing or stimulating domestic economic
activity. 138
There are different factors, which cause tax competition. One of the most
important factor is globalization139 and as its result increased mobility, which means that
multinational business enterprises of all sizes will enjoy an unprecedented array of
choices of regulatory and tax regimes, as well as unprecedented flexibility to take
advantage of these choices without significantly altering or compromising their business
plans. Another challenge for national tax administrations is development of the Internet,
which creates possibility for taxpayers to move to tax havens and do everything that they
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need to do to make lots of money all over the world, without establishing any taxable
presence in the major countries into which they sell – the world’s big industrial
democracies, thus, eroding their tax bases.140
Another factor determining tax competition is the need for investment. Countries
frequently engage in tax competition to attract investment from elsewhere, thereby
undermining the tax bases of other countries. Multinational agencies typically discourage
developing and transition countries from offering such incentives on the basis that
business usually attracted by other factors and that precious revenue is being given away.
Nevertheless, the existing international tax system does not give sufficient support to
countries to move away from the investment incentive approach. 141
Professor Musgrave, when she speaks about tax competition, concentrates on the
opposing interests of the source country and the residence country. She writes, in
particular, that to attract investments source country can offer profit tax incentives while
applying relatively high withholding rates to encourage reinvestment of earnings. This
pattern of behavior by the countries of source can lead to tax competition among-capital
importing countries with the result that no one country can obtain enough additional
investment from abroad to justify the lower tax. Furthermore, she argues, such tax
competition can have damaging effects on domestic tax equity. In her point of view, these
are highly relevant problems for the developing countries where foreign capital is needed
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for the development process, yet government revenue also needed to create the
infrastructure for that development.142
To protect national interest and to ensure tax revenue each country should develop
own anti-competition strategy. Doing this each sovereign is faced with two contradicting
policy determinations: (1) to try and protect the revenue yielded from its tax base, and (2)
to maintain a tax climate that favors the inflow of investment and discourages the outflow
of domestic capital resources.143
One of the possible measures is to deal with the problem unilaterally and to
introduce the taxation of immobile factors. In the era of globalization and, as a result, of
increased mobility of business inputs – especially capital – these inputs become much
more sensitive to differences in net-of-tax incomes earned in countries. Thus, any
changes in economic conditions, including fiscal policies of governments, would have a
substantial impact on the flow of capital and other related bus iness inputs between
countries, and governments would tend to avoid taxing internationally mobile factors of
production since the economic costs of the tax is greatest when business inputs easily
flow to other jurisdictions. Afterwards, it will be difficult to measure the mobile tax base
since income or transactions are not easily identified to a particular location. In this
situation it is more preferable for governments to tax immobile factors, such as real estate
and unskilled labor, since the economic cost of imposing the tax is less for these
immobile bases.144
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To resolve the problem on the multilateral basis, developed countries should
acknowledge and respect economic decisions made by developing countries. Absence of
examining developing country goals cannot be expected to foster progress.145
The supporters of tax competitions argue that the elimination of all tax
competition would be harmful indeed. Competition, according to them, denotes
alternatives and alternatives give multinationals the opportunity to leave and take their
investment with them. This opportunity to leave prevents governments from being
tyrants.146 Professor Jack Mintz states that differential tax policies across countries can
impact on the efficiency of worldwide production since businesses seek to allocate
resources to tax-favored regions of the world.147 But another attitude should be developed
by the international community towards harmful tax competition, which often occurs in
case of tax havens.
C. Special remarks on conflict of interests between tax havens and countries with normal
tax systems
Generally, tax havens are jurisdictions with nominal tax rates, or no tax rates, that
fail to generate significant revenue.148 The 1998 OECD report “Harmful Tax
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue” (1998) enumerates specific criteria for
identifying tax havens:
- the jurisdiction imposes no or only nominal taxes;
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- the jurisdiction lacks policy of effective exchange information;
- the jurisdiction lacks transparency;
- the jurisdiction has no requirement of substantial activities.149
The principal function of tax haven is the avoidance of high taxes. They may also
serve the purpose of postponing the imposition of tax, and provide an effective shield
against the dangers of confiscation and sanctions.150
There two major types of tax havens. The first type is a production tax haven,
where the country levies a very low tax rate on the income from manufacturing
operations located in its jurisdiction. The main purpose to become productive tax haven is
to attract real investment and economic activity into the country. The second type is a
traditional tax havens, where the country offers a low tax on the income of corporations
who establish their legal domicile in that country. In traditional tax havens the country
essentially offers its services, for a fee, to individuals and corporations pursuing tax
avoidance and evasion. 151
Globalization facilitates the trend towards financial tax havens. Internet
influenced tremendously on the ability of taxpayers to benefit from the connection of
regional markets through networked computers and high-speed telecommunications
increases the mobility of capital and financial flows between nations. Previously remote
tax regimes are now readily accessible; communication improvements allow for the
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spreading and sharing techniques between regions. The result is the lost revenue for high
tax jurisdictions.152
Of course, countries with relatively high tax rates (which are, obviously,
developed ones) could not tolerate loss of revenue and started coordinated attack against
low tax jurisdictions. They introduced two general approaches to manage the problem.
The first approach was targeted for closure of treaty shopping opportunity by way of the
toughening up of treaty terms coupled by the termination of some treaties with tax
havens. This was intended to dampen the extent to which havens could be used in
combination with flows of money through treaty routes. The second approach can be
characterized by unilateral legislative measures intended to tackle flows of money to and
from havens. These have included in particular the adoption of legislation of a Subpart F
pattern by most of the major world economies plus the moves on transfer pricing, bank
secrecy, conduit companies and other areas studied in details by the OECD as well as
individual states in the last decade. Both are partial answers to the problems presented to
major economies by havens.153
In addition to the exclusion of some tax havens from the tax treaty networks,
toughening treaty terms, and adoption of appropriate national laws, some state in
particular economic areas has joined the number of tax haven by providing with tax
exemption of income earned from particular economic activities and, thus, stepped into
direct competition with them. Also as an answer to tax avoidance and evasion, channeled
through low tax jurisdictions, developed countries strengthened enforcement of tax laws
including support by criminal provisions against taxpayers likely to be using haven roots,
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both nationally and through international cooperation. In addition, these anti-offshore
measures were backed by general reduction in direct tax rates.154
Paradoxically, some scientists consider that the best way to deal with the problem
is to propose more attractive environment for business rather than to propose new
administrative counter-measures. It sounds reasonable, when they say that the
competition rather than anything else that is likely to bring tax havens within tolerable
level of activity. Witting or otherwise, income taxes are slowly being converted into
expenditure taxes, and at the same time are being at the margin superseded by
expenditure taxes. It was suggested, that tax havens will have problems legally she ltering
taxpayers from expenditure taxes if expenditure occurs directly or indirectly within
another state’s jurisdiction. 155
The OECD plays especially active role in preventing tax avoidance and evasion
through tax havens. In its 1998 report “Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global
Issue” (1998)156 the OECD listed 19 recommendations for member states to counteract
the negative impacts of the tax systems of these jurisdictions. In particular, members
were provided with recommendations concerning domestic legislation and practices,
treaties, intensification international co-operation in response to harmful tax competition.
Later in 2000 the OECD presented the report “Towards Global Tax Co-operation:
Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices”157 on implementation of
the recommendations proposed by the 1998 Report. In this report it was stated that the
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initial reaction to the project of 1998 has been encouraging. A number of jurisdictions
reviewed under the tax haven criteria and also a number of non-member economies have
shown an interest in the project, resulting in an open dialogue. The process was
characterized as open and dynamic; it aimed to move forward co-operatively so long as a
co-operative approach bears fruit. It was also noticed that member countries are already
working to eliminate harmful tax practices, and many jurisdictions meeting the tax haven
criteria are actively considering taking a commitment within the next 12 months to
eliminate harmful tax practices in accordance with the 1998 Report.
Not everybody considers the 1998 and 2000 Reports positively, because,
according to them, the reports effectively dictate legislative and practice reforms targeted
jurisdiction must enact, thus violating international taxation principle. Further, although
the OECD claims that adoption of these fiscal reform recommendations are voluntary, the
threat of targeted jurisdictions being subjected to the defensive measures outlined in the
2000 Report effectively coerces these jurisdictions into an involuntarily compliance.158
Generally, the practice of the OECD aimed to reduce tax haven practice has often been
under the criticism in legal literature.159
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In 2001 the OECD issued another report “The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax
Practices: The 2001 Project Report”. 160 The project, in general, expressed a positive
approach towards tax competition, and noticed that more open and competitive
environment of the last decades has had many positive effects on tax systems, including
the reduction of tax rates and broadening of tax bases, which have characterized tax
reforms over the last 15 years. In part these developments can be seen as a result of
competitive forces, which have encouraged countries to make their tax systems more
attractive to investors. According to the Report, in addition to lowering overall tax rates,
a competitive environment can promote greater efficiency in government expenditure
programs. But the Report stated the fact that some tax and related practices are anti-
competitive and can undercut the gains that tax competition generates. This can occur,
according to the Report, when governments introduce practices designed to encourage
noncompliance with the tax laws of other countries.
Recently, the representatives of wealthy and Caribbean nations agreed to set up a
task force to reform offshore financial centers during the two-day OECD-sponsored
meeting in Barbados. This was a step in the creation of a multilateral forum for dialogue
and decision-making regarding the elimination of harmful tax competition. The group is
comprised of OECD Members and offshore centers, and will try to find a mutually
acceptable process of turning the three principles of transparency, non-discrimination,
and effective exchange of information into lasting commitments.161
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To date, the OECD’s initiative to eliminate tax practices has not been completely
successful. However, it has not been pursued in vain since the parties are still willing to
continue the co-operative dialogue and seem optimistic of eventually reaching an
agreement. With the passage of time, the death of tax havens seems to some to be
inevitable.162
D. Consequences of the conflict
Double taxation
International double taxation exists in its purest form when a single item of
income is subject to income tax by more than one country. This happens when nation-
states impose their taxes on a variety of jurisdictional bases under international law, and
these bases often overlap.163 Most countries impose taxes on income having its source
within their territory and, additionally, many countries impose taxation on the basis that
the taxpayer is resident within their jurisdiction. Other criteria such as nationality,
domicile, centre of economic interests, may also be used as a basis for tax liability.
Where these tax connecting factors are located in different jurisdictions, double taxation
may result.164
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Therefore, double taxation consists of the concurrence resulting from applying a
variety of rules to the same fact. Faced with various rules, the fact corresponds to what
they all provide for, therefore, involving the respective applicability.165
As it was stated above, under international law, there are some restrictions, which
shape a state’s jurisdiction to tax. But in the absence of uniform law the permissible
power of a nation to tax will often reach beyond its own borders. The exercise of
extraterritorial taxing jurisdiction necessarily implies a risk that income produced by a
taxpayer from international transaction will be subjected to the demands of tax laws of
two or more nations even though each nation is acting within the prescription of
international law. 166
Personal fiscal attachment and economic fiscal attachment are the main factors,
which, on the one hand, provide a country with a justification to impose taxes, and, on the
other hand, cause the double taxation problem that usually arises when a taxpayer who
has a personal relationship with one country (the home country) derives income from
sources within another country (the host country). The host country will usually assert
jurisdiction over the income on the basis of its economic relationship with the taxpayer.
The home country may also assert jurisdiction over the income on the basis of its
personal relationship with the taxpayer. In these situations, the countries involved must
decide whether and how to adjust their tax systems so as to avoid international double
taxation.
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To avoid double taxation a particular country can take unilateral and bilateral
measures. In case of unilateral measures the current international tax system generally
lefts it to the residence country to alleviate double taxation. 167 Traditionally, it has been
up to home country to solve the double taxation problems of its citizens and residents.
The home country can accomplish this only by forfeiting part or its entire jurisdictional
claim over the foreign-source income of its citizens and residents, either through a
territorial system or a credit system. 168
There are two common methods of alleviating double taxation. The first is the
worldwide or credit method in which the residence country taxes foreign source income
but provides a credit for taxes paid to foreign jurisdictions. The United States and many
other countries use a worldwide or extraterritorial system of for taxing international
income. Under such a system, a domestic taxpayer’s worldwide income, regardless of
source, is subject to taxation in the United States or other country of residence. However,
in order to mitigate international double taxation, the country of residence grants
domestic taxpayer a dollar-for-dollar credit for foreign income taxes paid by the domestic
taxpayer on foreign source-income.169
The second is the exemption method under which the residence country cedes all
taxing jurisdiction to the source country. Many countries, including a number of the
European countries, use some version of exemption of territorial source system for taxing
international income. Under such a system, many types, if not all, of a domestic
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taxpayer’s income from foreign sources are exempt from tax in the country of
residence.170
Bilateral measures are taken by the conclusion of tax conventions on avoidance of
double taxation, which we will discuss below. We agree with Professor Robert Peroni
when he states that the central function of international tax rules should be to attempt to
ensure that double taxation does not discourage the taxpayer from engaging in a cross-
border transaction if it makes economic sense to do so.171
Absence of taxation
Absence of taxation has the same origin as double taxation, namely absence of a
uniform approach to allocation of fiscal jurisdiction over income or tax events of
international nature. But result of the imperfect fit of national tax systems could be
different. If, in the case of double taxation, two or more jurisdictions overlap over the
same basis, in case of absence of taxation neither residence jurisdiction nor source
jurisdiction claim the right to tax. Inconsistent tax principles and source rules of different
countries have been known sometimes to combine benignly and allow total escape from
taxation by any country for those able to allow aligning their affairs artfully.172 Thus,
when countries exercise that jurisdiction on their own, transactions that have a connection
with more than one country may as a result of luck or tax planning escape the taxing
grasp of any country. 173
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In this case because of absence of international interaction between national tax
systems both country of residence and country of source loose their revenues and
taxpayer by means of jurisdiction shopping receives unjust enrichment.
E. Inferences
In a world economy with free movements of capital and labor, the ability of
governments to impose a high tax burden on such internationally mobile factors of
production is severely restricted unless a high degree of international coordination and
tax enforcement is reached among national authorities. Consequently, the tax burden is
likely to shift to some extent toward the internationally immobile factors of production
such as land or low-skilled labor. This tax shift limits the ability of national governments
to pursue independent policies of distribution and subsidized public services, which are at
the center of the welfare state.174
Whatever its consequences, tax competition is not under the control of
government of one particular state, even very powerful. The alternative is the conscious
mutual adjustment of tax systems to eliminate differences that might make one tax
jurisdiction more attractive than another as a place for investment or business activity. If
the tax laws of all countries were harmonized, i.e., had similar effect on commercial and
investment decisions, tax competition would obviously be avoided.175
This tax adjustment is possible only when two or more states agree upon the
division of sovereign power. This division will allow excluding unreasonable and
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harmful tax competition and avoiding double taxation including escaping from taxation.
This outcome path the way to analysis of problems arising out of international
cooperation on tax matters.
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CHAPTER 5
COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES ON TAX MATTERS
A. In General
There is a tremendous history of international cooperation in tax area – probably
greater than in any other legal area.176 It can be easily assumed, that the existence of this
history was determined by the fact, that taxation policies of one jurisdiction not only have
a significant impact on the efficiency of its own economy but also on the efficiency of
other economies linked to it.177
In international cooperation on tax matters the countries seek to achieve equity in
international taxation, and, thus, provide the foundation for an equitable international tax
system. Equity exists in the international tax system only when states distribute among
themselves the competence to tax in a way that conforms to prevailing views of justice
internationally. An equitable international tax system will not exist until some
international consensus can be reached on how countries should share among themselves
the competence to tax. 178
International cooperation allows countries to improve the coordination of tax
policies on international level. We can talk about several types of coordination. For
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instance, one type is aimed to make a country’s tax system more similar to others – in
other words, harmonize taxes. Other types aim to minimum or maximum rates of tax, to
avoid the double taxation of cross-border flows of income, to prevent transfer pricing, to
agree on competent authority arrangementg, and to curtail harmful tax competition. 179
In recent time of increasing e-commerce, international fiscal cooperation obtains
special importance. In the area of e-commerce, international cooperation is strongly
recommended. It is crucial that taxpayers know where the borderlines are and not be put
in a position to have a taxable presence in a country without even knowing that they have
business presence in that country. 180
International cooperation on tax matters still leave to wish the better, because
despite the worldwide consensus on the principles of international taxation, it is fair to
say that nations are quite reluctant to surrender their autonomy in this area.181 But new
challenges of modern era, such as growing mobility of assets of multinational enterprises
and growing use of cyberspace, will inevitably push countries to close cooperation. It
may well be that these continuing developments eventually will compel the transfer of
national respons ibility for some taxes to an international authority. 182
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B. Bilateral cooperation on tax matters
Bilateral tax treaties
Tax lawyers recognized very early that under international law situations of
concurrent jurisdictions may arise and that general international law does not contain
rules to settle conflicts of concurrent jurisdictions. Hence a practice has developed to
issues of exterritorial taxation by double taxation treaties.183
Today the public international law of taxation is dominated by over 1500 bilateral
treaties for the prevention of double taxation of income and capital. This treaty network
has been called a “triumph of international law” and a framework for an international tax
regime based on the principles underlying in these treaties.184 This network of bilateral
tax treaties for the prevention of double taxation of income and capital constitutes one of
the main avenues of cooperation for coordination of the international tax system. 185
The essential purpose of the tax treaties is to allocate the tax base between two
contracting parties. This allocation divides tax base in the following way: active business
should taxed in the country in which it originates (the source country) and passive income
should be taxed in the country in which the recipient of the income resides (the residence
country). Under active business treaties understand business activity through permanent
establishment and give the source country the primary right to tax the profits from that
operation. The residence country is required to exempt those profits from tax, at least to
the extent they were taxed by the source country. Passive income (such as interest,
dividends, royalties) is usually taxed at reduced rates or totally exempted from taxation in
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the source country, leaving the right to tax that income to the residence country. 186 The
provisions of typical tax treaty include an enumeration of specific abatement or
exemption of taxation for residents of one country on certain type of income from the
other.187
Technically, the typical treaty provides that business profits are usually exempt
from tax in the country of source unless the profits are attributable to a permanent
establishment in the source country. The tax treaty often provides an exemption from tax
in the source country for income from personal services performed in an independent
capacity. The tax treaty also often provides an exemption for an employee’s personal
service income provided that the employee is present in the country for not more than a
specified period of time and the compensation is by a nonresident employer that does not
have a permanent establishment. The treaty typically reduces or eliminates the
withholding tax on at least some items of investment-type income such as interest,
dividends, rents and royalties not attributable to business conducted through a permanent
establishment. The tax treaty also provides that the country of residence may tax capital
gains.188
The delimitation of the tax base between sovereign fiscal jurisdictions prevents
taxes from interfering with the free flow of international trade and investment. Their
basic thrust is the avoidance of double taxation of income from international transactions
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by limiting jurisdiction to tax. 189 Treaties typically are concerned with the apportionment
of the tax revenues between the treasures of the treaty countries.
Formally, in tax treaties one can find different governmental statements of the
purpose of double taxation conventions. These purposes might include the following
objectives: eliminating double taxation in order to prevent the discouragement of
international trade; providing for cooperation between tax administrations to combat tax
evasion; providing certainty as to the tax regime faced by investors and traders – again to
prevent to discouragement of international trade; the elimination of discriminatory
taxation; the sharing of tax revenue.190
Tax treaties can be classified into two groups. The first group consists of the tax
convention itself, namely, for the avoidance of double taxation on income and capital or
on estates. In these treaties the contracting states agree on reciprocal restrictions on the
exercise of their tax jurisdiction. The second group consists of treaties, which cover tax
issues along with different commercial matters. In this type of treaty, states mutually
confer on each other national treatment or most favored nation treatment, often
specifically with regard to income taxes. It can be said that there is also group of human
rights treaties. Some of these treaties have the potential of being developed by the courts
into effective weapons against tax discrimination. 191
In addition it should be said that tax treaties must not only deal with jurisdictional
issues and prevention of extraterritorial taxation, but also must unify the existing fiscal
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concepts by providing exhaustive definitions that are not dependent on national
regulations or concepts.192
Special note should be made in respect to conventional tax relations between
developed and developing countries. Tax treaties are intended to shift revenues from
source to residence jurisdictions by reducing source-based taxation. This shift is generally
acceptable, however, only if the reduction in source-based taxation is reciprocal and
capital flows in each direction are broadly similar. In that situation, which is typical
between developed countries, it makes sense to mutually reduce source-based taxes
because each country will collect more residence-based taxes. The pattern of economic
relations between developing and industrialized countries is characterized by income
flows largely form the former to the latter countries. This makes the revenue sacrifice on
the basis of source one-way and prejudicial to the tax interests of developing countries.193
This explains why there are relatively fewer treaties between developed and developing
countries.194
Double taxation treaties are concluded on a bilateral basis. This bilateral character
of treaties may raise specific problems in situations where more than two states are
involved, for example the problems raised by typical triangle cases, i.e. those in which:
income from dividends, interest or royalties is derived from a source in state S; such
income is received by a permanent establishment in state P; the permanent establishment
depends on an enterprise resident in state R. 195 Such an example means, that
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internationalization of business goes beyond the ability of a bilateral treaty to properly
respond to the increasing degree of mobility of business factors.
These examples show that bilateral tax treaties by their nature have limits when
interests of third country are involved. These shortcomings inevitably call for cooperation
on multilateral basis.
Model treaties
At this moment model treaties can be considered today as a proper substitution for
agreements on multilateral basis, because voluntarism, which followed from state
sovereignty, made it hard to achieve agreement on a multilateral arrangement of any
substance, unless common interest or universalist sentiments were very strong. The use of
a Model treaty is a very flexible technique, which provides the basis for negotiation of
bilateral agreements suitably adapted for the particular characteristics of the particular
parties’ national systems and their interactions, notably for coordinating income
taxation. 196
The most successful attempt to create a model treaty has been made under the
auspices of the Organisation for International Cooperation and Development.  Formed in
an effort to represent the concerns of its member nations, the OECD is now rapidly
transforming itself into a global consultant. In an area of international taxation, the
OECD made a major contribution to the alleviation of double taxation with its Model
Double Tax Convention of 1977, which served as a template for subsequent treaties.197 It
appears likely, in consequence, that OECD text will become increasingly firmly rooted as
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the international standard, while variations from it to accommodate the special concerns
of the developing countries may continue to evolve.198 In addition to a series of model
treaties the OECD also issued valuable commentaries on the model treaty provisions. The
OECD Model Treaty is intended mostly in relations between developed countries. This
Model Treaty mostly requires the country of source to give up revenue.
Another model treaty prepared by the United Nations aimed to deal with tax
issues between developed and developing countries. The UN Model does not seek to
allocate primary tax jurisdiction on a basis other than the residence used by the OECD
Model. What it does is to expand the tax right of the source country within the basic
framework of the OECD Model. The UN Model restricts the source country’s power to
tax profits of foreign enterprises to cases where the enterprise of one country operates in
the other country through permanent establishment. The UN Model adopts a much wider
definition of the phrase “permanent establishment” and allows for wider taxation at
source of such income as interest, dividends, royalties and profit from international
traffic.199
The existence of model treaties represents a strong example of the possibility of
reaching consensus on multilateral bases. These model treaties encourage the
introduction of uniform understanding of important fiscal concepts, which is shared by a
lot of number of countries. Model treaties prove that multilateral consensus is, in
principle, possible. This possibility opens the door for increasing multilateral fiscal
cooperation.
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C. Multilateral fiscal cooperation
Multilateral treaties
The common model for treaties intended to eliminate international double
taxation is bilateral. It was justly stated that the bilateral approach seems anomalous in an
era where taxpayers have become global and many other regulatory areas increasingly are
being dealt with globally by governments.200
The bilateral character of the treaties has its shortcomings in the modern
integrated world. To achieve their objectives, it clearly is desirable for double tax treaties
to be as broadly based and as wide in application as possible, yet this ideal is constrained
by practical factors, such as the degree of consensus that can be reached between states,
and the need to employ precise language while attempting to accommodate the differing
concepts and policies of national tax systems.201 Thus, the way to the conclusion of
multilateral tax treaties does not appear to be paved. The more states – and interests –
involved, the less are the chances of concluding a final agreement.202 Even the OECD has
been unsuccessful in translating bilateral treaties into anything resembling a multilateral
treaty.
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But multilateral treaties do, however, exist. Of those still in force, at least one is
undoubtedly of great importance for the contracting countries, namely treaty between the
Nordic countries for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income and
capital.203 There are other multilateral conventions, for example, such as Convention of
Andean Group for avoidance of double taxation, the Brazzaville Convention concluded
by four states of Equatorial Africa and some others.
The fact that some multilateral conventions have been concluded – although in
insignificant numbers – could point to the development of this course. Development in
terms of reconciling different tax systems followed by equality would make conclusion of
multilateral agreements easier. Moreover, bilateral conventions with essentially the same
rules can lead to conclusion of conventions with a greater number of parties. However,
conclusion of multilateral conventions between countries with different interests would
not seem possible.204
Institutional framework of cooperation
An important role in multilateral cooperation on tax matters, unquestionably,
belongs to the WTO. Two main topics on the agenda of the WTO are directly related to
tax issues: liberalizing trade in goods, which recently has been extended in part to
services and intellectual property and prohibitions against certain subsidies.
The basic approach to liberalizing trade under GATT has been to couple reduction
of import barriers with the requirement of nondiscrimination for imports once in the
country. Nondiscrimination under GATT includes an obligation of national treatment,
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which in this case prohibits discriminatory treatment of foreign goods. This obligation
specifically applies to domestic taxation, which cannot be used “so as to afford
protection” to domestic products. The one of the key substantive provision in the GATT
approach to reduce import barriers is to bound tariffs to agreed-upon levels in specific
schedules.205
The second topic concerning certain subsidies was addressed by GATT in the way
of their prohibition. The Uruguay Round yielded a new Subsidies Code included in the
1994 version of GATT. The Subsidies Code defines subsidy as including cases where
government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected. The language of
Subsidy Code recognizes that the direct tax system can be the vehicle for providing
export subsidies, such as when income ascribe to the production of goods for export is
given preferential tax treatment.206
It can be said that production tax havens constitute prohibited export subsidies
under the GATT. They invariably involve foregone revenue, are specific to certain
taxpayers, and are, in fact, contingent on export performance because the products they
involve cannot be targeted at the domestic market.207
The WTO also may lead to the creation of world tax rules by its dispute resolution
practice. International tax and trade law have developed differently with respect to
dispute resolution. Unlike tax law, international trade law has evolved over the years, so
that there is now a substantial component of binding adjudication, particularly since
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Uruguay Round.208 For example, the Appellate Body of the WTO recently upheld a Panel
decision that the U.S. tax treatment of FSCs contained within sections 921 to 927 of the
Internal Revenue Code constitutes an illegal export subsidy under WTO rules. FSCs are
subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, which carry out certain export-related activities on
behalf of their U.S. parents. Income attributed to FSCs is partly exempt from U.S. income
taxes.209
Analyzing correlation between development of international trade law and
international tax law professors Joel Slemrod and Reuven Avi-Yonah pose the question,
whether development of current trade and tax policies complementary or potentially
conflicting? According to them the answer is that these policies are complementary,
because free trade requires single taxation of factor incomes, which is goal of bilateral
treaties.210
Preparation of multilateral treaties concerning tax issues was attempted within the
OECD. Since 1995, a Multinational Agreement on Investment has been under negotiation
at the OECD. The basic nondiscrimination concepts of national treatment most-favored-
nation treatment would apply to foreign investment, along with a commitment to the free
flow of funds in and out of member countries. The official commentary states that the
parties recognize the importance of nondiscrimination in the taxation of foreign investors
and investments, but that nondiscrimination is to be implemented under the double
taxation treaties.211
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The activity of WTO witnesses that national tax policy at least in some part is not
anymore business of one particular state. WTO contributes considerably in the area of
multilateral tax cooperation and coordination especially by providing member states with
an international mechanism of tax dispute settlement.
Unification and harmonization of tax law
In 1963 Arthur Dale in his book about tax harmonization in Europe distinguished
two types of harmonization: harmonization of laws and harmonization of rates and types
of tax. According to him, harmonization of laws consists of adopting the same rules, for
example, for calculating depreciation, and this type of harmonization has perspective to
proceed fairly quickly. This is not the case with the second type of harmonization,
because types and rates of tax are directly connected to social, economic, religious or
political motives. Thus, the author concludes, the balance will have been established over
many years, and to try to force harmonization quickly would seriously disturb the
equilibrium and do more harm than good.212
First of all, the tax treaties should unify the fiscal concepts by providing
exhaustive definitions that are not dependent on national regulations or concepts.213 One
of the main notions of international and national tax systems is the notion of income. For
international tax system to work everyone has to agree on what constitutes income, when
to tax it, and how to coordinate those issues on an international basis.214 This agreement
will allow every item of income to be taxed once and allocate the income fairly among
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the jurisdictions in which the people who possess that income, whether businesses or
individuals, enjoy the services provided by those jurisdictions.
In addition, the obvious advantage of having uniform definitions of income is
administrative. Tax administration and enforcement could become much simpler. Given
preexisting differences in language and culture and the political sensitivities that are
implicated in the operation of a tax system, it strains credulity to believe that
standardization would lead to the creation of a single international tax enforcement
agency. 215
The problems of unification and harmonization remain extremely important for
Internet taxation. Professor Richard Doernberg along with other authors of book,
dedicated to problem of e-commerce taxation, argues that countries must unify
conflicting tax laws to effectively tax e-commerce because without unification the
potential exists for countries to double tax these transactions.216
D. Administrative cooperation against tax evasion and avoidance
Many problems of enforcement of national tax laws in the international context
dictate the necessity for multilateral cooperation on administrative level. The
fundamental factors, which determine such cooperation, are the removal of capital
controls and the continuing liberalization of the financial markets, which increased the
flows of cross-border investment and accelerated the pace of integration of national
economies. Improved global communication technologies have enabled large
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corporations and financial institutions to develop global strategies. Whilst these
developments have lead to a rapid expansion of cross border activities they have also
increased the geographical mobility of national tax bases and the scope for tax avoidance
and evasion. 217 Developing avoidance techniques, such as use of tax havens and transfer-
price adjustments, has spurred national tax administrations to accept the need for tax
treaties, realizing that regulatory enforcement on a purely national basis would be
ineffective in view of the opportunities for avoidance and evasion available to
internationally-operating businesses.218
Because jurisdiction to enforce national tax laws is restricted in international law
by national boundaries, without an established treaty network on administrative
cooperation few countries will permit a foreign tax inspector, collector, or prosecutor to
ply his trade within their borders. If he is permitted any entrance at all, he is under strict
limitations of an ad hoc arrangement.219
The same could be said about extradition, as far as one of the most effective ways
to secure implementation of national tax worldwide is to conclude bilateral treaties
providing extradition of tax criminals. Extradition is the surrender of an individual
accused or convicted of a crime by the state within whose territory he is found to the state
under whose laws he is alleged to have committed or to have been convicted of the
crime.220 Such extradition of tax criminals, definitely, will require high degree of
congruence of the tax laws of different states, because under the requirement of “double
criminality”, extradition is available only when the act is punishable under the law of
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both states. Consequently, the name of the offence and the elements that make it criminal
need be approximately the same.221
This question of prevention of tax crimes on the international level remains
difficult, as far as under general international law, co-operation in the enforcement of
fiscal laws has been treated anomalously. On the one hand, courts have frequently taken
the firm position that they can not assist in the enforcement of the revenue laws of
another state: this can best be explained as part of the general international law principle
that states do not enforce each other’s penal or public laws. On the other hand,
arrangements for international co-operation in penal or criminal matters, notably for the
extradition of alleged offenders, normally exclude fiscal matters even tax fraud. Hence, in
the absence of specific treaty provisions, tax authorities may have little remedy against
even a blatant tax evader who is neither present nor has assets in their country. 222
This policy of states based on rejection to enforce foreign tax laws is not
unanimously supported. Some people state that never was it possible to develop a
coherent reasoning for why, in the field of public law, co-operation among courts and
court related administrative authorities was less proper than co-operation in civil and
commercial matters.223
The problems of international administrative tax cooperation on tax matters do
not always arise out of legal shortcomings. One should take into account economic
reasons of tax evasion treaties being unsuccessful. Developing countries refused to enter
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into tax evasion treaties because of the unilateral harm they receive due to decreased tax
revenue and resulting lack of offsetting investments.224
The main purpose of treaties in area of international administrative cooperation is
the prevention of fiscal evasion. Tax treaties contain provisions for the exchange of
information. They simply have the advantage of providing for exchange of information
on a reciprocal basis, plus the opening of a channel for this cooperation. 225 In addition to
the problems of tax evasion the tax treaty now also is intended to facilitate a coordinated
administrative approach to avoidance.226
Usually, the tax treaty rules provide for an exchange of information that will
enable the tax administration to verify whatever facts it deems necessary for effecting a
proper tax examination. The treaties typically authorize parties to exchange information
filed by, and relating to the activities of, taxpayers engaged in international business.
Administrative cooperation also includes provision that authorizes both countries to
challenge transfer prices between associated enterprises.227 By providing for direct
contact between administrators, without the need for communication through diplomatic
channels, the tax treaties established a process of administrative internationalization,
which was, and to a considerable extent remains, unique. The tax treaty administrative
provisions have gone further than others since they cover not only exchange of
information and policy concentration, but also explicitly provide for coordinated
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enforcement in individual cases, which has also led to establishing procedures for
simultaneous examination of related taxpayers.228
For the obtaining of information in foreign country the help of foreign tax
administration is used under special request, and any information so obtained should be
subject to the same secrecy as other tax information. In obtaining of information several
restrictions should be observed. For example, the treaty should not require the country
supplying the information to carry out administrative measures at variance with its laws
and practices or to supply information that is not obtainable under its laws or in the
normal course of its domestic tax administration. The assistance should not be so broad
as to allow the enforcement of arbitrary foreign taxes. It should be given only with
respect to taxes that have been finally determined. Collection in the foreign country
would be in accordance with the collection laws of that country. 229
In addition to the provision dealing with the exchange of information the
agreements include resolution methods for tax disputes related to international
enforcement issues. Nations entering into these arrangements contribute to the intangible
benefits of improved foreign relations and increased clarity for non-resident investors of
another country’s tax system and administration. 230
Professor Peter Schlosser states that the most recent trend in international
administrative cooperation is mutual collection of taxes. He takes as an example Article
23 of the German-French Double Taxation Convention. He founds this convention as
particularly far-reaching because it also contemplates tax claims, which have not yet
definitely been settled by an unappealable decision. He also addresses two German-
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Swedish (1992) and German-Danish (1995) conventions the principle of mutual
collection and quote the following provisions: “On the request of the competent authority
of one Contracting State, the other Contracting State carries out, subject to …, the
collection of tax claims as if they were its own claims”. 231
The OECD Model Treaty in Article 26 permits the competent authorities of the
two contracting state to exchange such information as is necessary for carrying out two
purposes: firstly, for carrying out the provisions of the convention, and, second, for
carrying out the domestic laws of the contracting state concerning the taxes covered by
the convention. 232
But this trend in collection of foreign taxes still exists on bilateral basis and even
within the European Union there is no general rule attributable to the EU’s committing
the member states to collect each other’s taxes. In collection of value added taxes, the
cooperation among the taxation authorities must by necessity be particularly close. 233 By
contrast, the directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 is limited only to providing for
mutual information. 234
Existing examples of multilateral administrative cooperation shown above prove
that this process is difficult and will take time. The disparities in national tax laws and
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irrespective of the manner in which they are levied, all taxes imposed on total income, on total capital, or
on elements of income or of capital, including taxes on gains from the disposal of movable or immovable
property, taxes on the amounts of wages or salaries paid by enterprises, as well as taxes on capital
appreciation. Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the
competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation, available at
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practices and the difficulties of reaching agreement on general principles of fairness in
defining and allocating the international tax base make it hard to obtain a political support
for a comprehensive agreement.235 Also international tax law should provide some
measure of agreement on procedural safeguards for administrative arrangements.236 An
Internet development introduced additional problems in tax administration, and these
problems are increasing faster than their multilateral solutions.237
Nevertheless the multilateral administrative cooperation on tax matters is
developing. The most progress in the area of multilateral cooperation in tax matters has
occurred in Europe.238 Under the 1978 Additional Protocol to the European Convention
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, members of the Council of Europe abandoned
their discretion to refuse assistance in relation to fiscal matters.239 As of the beginning of
2003 thirty-five states have ratified this protocol. The various successes within the EU
and among its members are relevant only on a regional level. To deal with non-criminal
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7L0799&model=guichett (last visited March 22, 2003).
235 SOL PICCIOTTO, supra note 28, at 256.
236 Id. at 256-7.
237 Jonathan Gaskin reasonably states: The phenomenon of Internet commerce may herald the end of
effective extra-national fiscal regulation. Certainly, anonymous remailers and Web sites are here to stay.
Anonymous communication accompanies those tools. Tax havens and other jurisdictions that seriously
enforce anonymity and privacy abound and do not seem to be waning. Digital cash is in its infancy, but will
most likely sweep the world. The need to comply with complex and burdensome extra-territorial tax
regulations will likely be swept away by it. Regulation of tax evasion, tax avoidance may become moot.
Jonathan Gaskin, Policing the Global Marketplace: Wielding a knife in a Gunfight, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 191, 210 (1999).
238 Benjamin R. Hartman, Coercing Cooperation from Offshore Financial Centers: Identity and
Coincidence of International Obligations Against Money Laundering and Harmful Tax Competition , 24
B.C. INT’L & COMP . L. REV. 253, 280-1 (2001).
239 The Protocol withdraws the possibility offered by the Convention to refuse assistance solely on the
ground that the request concerns an offence which the requested Party considers a fiscal offence. It extends
international co-operation to the service of documents concerning the enforcement of a sentence and
similar measures (suspension of pronouncement of a sentence, conditional release, deferment of
commencement of enforcement of a sentence or interruption of such enforcement). Finally, it adds
provisions relating to the exchange of information on judicial records. Additional Protocol to the European
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of March 17, 1978, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm (last visited March 22, 2003).
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tax matters, as it was mentioned above, the Council of European Communities issued
Directive 77/799/CEE. This enjoys no application outside Europe. The Nordic Countries
have further implemented regionally the Nordic Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax
Matters, which has been in force since 1991. Attempts to extend such a uniform approach
to legal assistance in tax matters outside Europe have not been as successful.
In 1988, the OECD, together with Council of Europe, drafted the Multilateral
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.240 This convention has
not been broadly accepted. It has finally come into force seven years after it opened for
signature. The convention, however, was especially intended to establish assistance,
which comprises all mutual assistance activities in tax matters, which can be carried out
by the public authorities, including the judicial authorities, and which are not covered by
criminal law.  Any information or assistance, which judicial bodies may need in order to
judge and punish criminal offences in tax matters, must, therefore, be obtained under the
conventions for mutual assistance in criminal matters.241
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E. Inferences
In the absence of international tax treaties, it is evident that the taxation of foreign
income earned by residents and of domestic income earned by non-residents, can raise
problems of inefficiency of allocating of foreign investment and predatory inequities in
the tax shares of that income. Cooperative rules are needed both for reasons of economic
efficiency and inter-nation equity. Cooperation also is essential for administrative
reasons, in particular for reporting purposes. Such cooperation can take various forms. It
may be presented by the current network of bilateral tax treaties between countries of
residence and source; which broadly follows an internationally accepted model tax treaty
format. Such tax treaties may be supplemented by multilateral agreements, particularly
among countries of source to prescribe rules for the division of base and rates of tax.
Finally, a higher degree of international cooperation may be called for which assigns
certain taxes, such as the corporation income tax, to an international authority. 242
Professor Nancy H. Kaufman poses a question: What is it that has kept us from
achieving greater international cooperation in substantive tax matters? Her answer is: A
good bet is that the stumbling blocks have somewhat less to do with economic analysis
and more to do with various sovereign actors’ perceptions of the fairness of the
distribution of tax base internationally.243
In this chapter I tried to support my thesis by the examples of bilateral and
multilateral cooperation. The latter is considered today as the preferable solution but at
the same time most difficult to achieve. The diversity of national interests makes the
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243 Nancy H. Kaufman, supra note 91, at 1470.
81
process of multilateral cooperation extremely difficult, and only when there is
understanding that there is a common denominator under different national tax policies
will this process become more evident.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
If we look at the modern world we can see that little can stop its steady
integration. In the last years, most of the economies, which have tried to stand apart – like
those of Russia and Eastern Europe, Brazil and other South American states, and some of
the states of Asia, have found themselves unable to do so.244 In the course of this
integration, old principles of international jurisdiction and sovereignty simply do not
provide an adequate basis for the preservation of national tax systems.245 Nations can no
longer worry solely about the national effects of a chosen taxing scheme. Because of the
increased integration of national economies, nations must now also factor into their tax
system design the potential interactions their system may have with the systems of their
sovereign global neighbors, and take on the often-impracticable task of designing tax
systems that interact well with those systems.246
Let me return to the world tax system and to look at it again through new
perspective of the results of present research. The cooperative ties on bilateral and
multilateral bases become more and more stronger. This cooperation is an inevitable
process as far as there are such common problems for all nations as avoidance of double
taxation, transborder enforcement of national tax laws, and equitable distribution of tax
revenues between nations.
                                                                
244 DAVID W. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 158.
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In summary, my thesis may be succinctly stated as follows: Today’s main
characteristics of a state’s jurisdiction to tax do not comply with the necessity of effective
administration of national fiscal laws in integrated world. This explains why a particular
fiscal jurisdiction needs another qualitative dimension, which can be achieved only on the
higher level of international systematic cooperation.
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